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In this experiment, we analyze strategic delegation in a Cournot duopoly. Own-
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1 Introduction
Coined by Schelling (1960), the term strategic delegation refers to a situation where a
player uses a delegate as a \commitment device." In closely related models, Fershtman
and Judd (1987), Sklivas (1987), and Vickers (1985) (henceforth FJSV), have formally
shown how strategic delegation may serve as such a commitment device in oligopoly.
Delegation of this type has received considerable attention in the theory of markets with
separation of decision making and ownership. This paper provides an experimental
investigation into the matter.
Consider a simple Cournot duopoly and imagine one ¯rm employs a delegate to
decide upon its supply while the other does not. In that case, the ¯rst ¯rm can,
by choosing an appropriate incentive contract for its manager, induce a Stackelberg
outcome.1 This increases the ¯rst ¯rm's equilibrium pro¯ts. As FJSV have shown,
markets become more competitive when ¯rms use delegates whose incentives can de-
pend on pro¯ts and sales. If both ¯rms employ managers, they will choose equilibrium
contracts with a sales bonus, inducing quantities that exceed the Cournot equilibrium
quantities (which result if both ¯rms take their decisions without delegates). Hence,
¯rms' pro¯ts decrease. Firms face a dilemma situation.
The literature following FJSV has shown that the observability of contracts may
be crucial for the results. Katz (1991) argues that unobservable contracts have no
commitment value at all.2 In contrast to that, Fershtman and Kalai (1997) analyze the
conditions under which delegation, even when unobservable, may a®ect the outcome of
an ultimatum game. In a recent experiment, these results were experimentally tested
by Fershtman and Gneezy (1999). They show that unobservable delegation indeed
matters|even if theory does not predict an e®ect of delegation. The main insight of
Fershtman and Gneezy's study is that because of the introduction of a third player (the
delegate) the ultimatum game is perceived more competitive which may drive behavior
closer to the game{theoretic prediction.
1Technically speaking, the ¯rst ¯rm can arbitrarily manipulate its manager's response function.
Thus, it can \select" any quantity combination which lies on the second ¯rm's response function.
2Bagwell (1995) shows that any noise associated with the observation of the ¯rst mover's choice (in
a sequential game) eliminates the ¯rst{mover advantage. See Huck and MÄuller (2000) for experimental
evidence.
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In this paper, we report results from an experiment designed to test the FJSV
prediction for markets. We study a simple Cournot duopoly framework matching the
requirements of the FJSV theory. The main question is whether ¯rm owners indeed
provide contracts with sales bonuses, making their managers more \aggressive" and,
thus, rendering the market outcomes more competitive.3 In the experiment each ¯rm
has one owner and one manager. Owners simultaneously choose between two di®er-
ent contracts which determine their managers' possible salaries. One contract induces
managers to maximize pro¯ts, while with the second contract managers' salaries are
a convex combination of pro¯ts and sales. The chosen contracts become public infor-
mation. Then managers simultaneously decide about quantities. Markets are repeated
and an owner{manager pair always stays together.
This basic setup is varied in three treatments. All treatments implement \15 years"
of market interaction. In two treatments, each year consists of four \quarters." While
in these treatments owners only decide once a year about the contract, the managers
have to make their choice in every quarter. This gives managers time for learning in the
reached subgames. These two treatments di®er with respect to the matching between
¯rms. In one treatment two ¯rms interact repeatedly over the complete course of the
experiment. In the other treatment, ¯rms are randomly rematched at the beginning of
each year, but they stay together for four quarters. The third treatment di®ers from
the ¯rst two in that there are no quarters. Here ¯rms are also randomly rematched
every year.
The theoretical prediction is identical for all these treatments: Owners should
choose the contract entailing sales bonuses, and managers should, accordingly, produce
above the Cournot level. The surprising result is, however, that owners rarely choose
the equilibrium contract. Moreover, it turns out that|given managers' behavior in
asymmetric subgames, i.e., in subgames in which they have di®erent contracts|these
choices are rational.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the underlying
theory and the experimental design, Section 3 reports the experimental results, and
3See Dufwenberg and GÄuth (1999) for a comparison of the strategic delegation model and an evo-
lutionary model of such \aggressive" preferences.
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Section 4 concludes.
2 Theory and Experimental Design
In line with the FJSV model, we use linear demand and cost functions for our experi-
ment. More speci¯cally, inverse demand was
p(q1; q2) = max f60 ¡ q1 ¡ q2; 0g
where qi; i = 1; 2; denotes ¯rm i's output. In order to avoid negative pro¯ts, we set
constant marginal cost equal to zero. Manager i's incentives, gi; are a combination of
pro¯ts and sales:4
gi(q1; q2; ¸i) = p(q1; q2) ¢ qi + ¸i ¢ qi = (max f60 ¡ q1 ¡ q2; 0g + ¸i) ¢ qi:
Straightforward computation shows that manager i chooses in equilibrium
qi =
60 + 2¸i ¡ ¸¡i
3
; i = 1; 2:
Owners simultaneously decide about ¸1 and ¸2. Their objective is to maximize pro¯ts
pqi. Again it is straightforward to compute the equilibrium actions. Owners choose
¸¤1 = ¸¤2 = 12
which induces q¤1 = q¤2 = 24. By contrast, if owners choose ¸1 = ¸2 = 0, both managers
produce q1 = q2 = 20 (the Cournot quantities of the duopoly without delegation).
In an experimental market, strategic delegation is presumably of considerable com-
plexity. For every (¸1; ¸2){combination, there is a di®erent subgame with di®erent
equilibrium outputs in those subgames. Generally, subjects in multi{stage experiments
do not play the subgame perfect equilibrium very well (see, for example, the literature
on the ultimatum game which Fershtman and Gneezy (1999) study). Therefore, we
simpli¯ed the design as far as possible.
We restricted the owners' strategy sets to only two choices which we labelled \Con-
tract A" and \Contract B". Contract A corresponds to ¸i = 0, while Contract B
4With positive costs, one could also consider a combination of pro¯ts and revenue (see Sklivas,
1987).
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corresponds to ¸i = 12; the equilibrium contract. In order to avoid a possible bias be-
cause of the labels \A" and \B", in ¯ve out of twelve sessions the labelling was reversed
such that the equilibrium contract was Contract A. Since there were no signi¯cant dif-
ferences between those treatments, we pooled the data and will henceforth refer to the
equilibrium contract as Contract B.
We also restricted managers' strategy sets. More precisely, we let them choose from
the set of quantities which are optimal in the four unrestricted quantity subgames. As
noted above, if both owners choose Contract A, i.e., if ¸1 = ¸2 = 0, both managers
optimally choose q1 = q2 = 20. If both owners choose Contract B, i.e., ¸1 = ¸2 = 12,
managers' optimal choice is q1 = q2 = 24. Finally, the asymmetric Contract A/Contract
B outcome with ¸i = 12 and ¸j = 0, leads to qi = 28 and qj = 16. Therefore, managers'
strategy set was f16; 20; 24; 28g.
This reduced game was presented to subjects by payo® tables rather than by the
model's parameters and payo® functions.5 The payo® matrices are reproduced in Ta-
bles 1{3. They are, in principle, derived from the above linear model (see Appendix
B). Analyzing these tables also shows that the game can be solved by iterated elimi-
nation of dominated strategies. For reasons of plausibility of the frame, owners' pro¯ts
and managers' salaries were of di®erent magnitudes. In order to equalize average pay-
ments of owners and managers, we used di®erent exchange rates when converting the
experimental payments into Deutsche marks (see below).
Table 1 is the pro¯t table of an owner. If both owners choose Contract A, the
payo® matrix of a manager is as in Table 2 (left). If both owners choose Contract
B, the relevant manager matrix is the one in Table 2 (right). If one owner chooses
Contract A while the other owner chooses Contract B, the matrix shown in Table 3
results. A ¯fth table given to subjects (not reproduced here) gave the payo®s in case
the ¯rst manager had Contract B and the second manager had Contract A. This table
is somewhat redundant but it might have helped subjects understanding the game. All
¯ve tables were given to all subjects before they knew which role they would play.
5Since the size of the quantities f16; 20; 24; 28g is entirely meaningless to subjects (recall that they
did not know the model), we labelled the strategies f1; 2; 3; 4g instead. However, since the reader is
familiar with the model and the equilibrium values, we will refer to quantities f16; 20; 24; 28g throughout
the paper.
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16 20 24 28
16 450; 450 380; 490 310; 480 260; 450
20 490; 380 400; 400 320; 380 240; 350
24 480; 310 380; 320 290; 290 200; 220
28 450; 260 350; 240 220; 200 110; 110
Table 1: Payo® table for owners
16 20 24 28
16 58; 58 50; 64 40; 62 33; 58
20 64; 50 52; 52 42; 50 31; 46
24 62; 40 50; 42 37; 37 26; 29
28 58; 33 46; 31 29; 26 15; 15
16 20 24 28
16 49, 49 41, 61 31, 65 24, 67
20 61, 41 49, 49 39, 53 28, 55
24 65, 31 53, 39 40, 40 29, 38
28 67, 24 55, 28 38, 29 24, 24
Table 2: Payo® table for managers given Contract A/Contract A (left) and given Contract
B/Contract B (right)
16 20 24 28
16 58, 49 50, 61 40, 65 33, 67
20 64, 41 52, 49 42, 53 31, 55
24 62, 31 50, 39 37, 40 26, 38
28 58, 24 46, 28 29, 29 15, 24
Table 3: Payo® table for managers given Contract A/Contract B
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Subjects remained acting either as an owner or a manager for the entire course of
the experiment. Also the owner{manager couples remained ¯xed over all periods.
The market lasted for 15 \years." At the beginning of each year, owners had to
choose the contract for their managers. The contract decisions were made public to all
four participants afterwards. Then managers had to choose outputs. In two treatments,
each year consisted of four \quarters" and the managers had to make their choice in
every quarter. Our motivation for the introduction of quarters was that subjects might
need some time for learning within a certain subgame. To control for the e®ect of
this design feature, there was a third treatment in which there were no quarters and
managers had to decide only once in each year.
Our three treatments di®ered with respect to the form of interaction between ¯rms.
The above theory is of static nature. In the ¯eld, interaction in duopoly is in general
repeated. Our ¯rst treatment, called FixFour, has ¯xed duopoly pairs playing over
the 15 years consisting of four quarters each. In the second treatment, RandFour,
duopolies were assembled randomly in every year, but managers interacted repeatedly
over the four quarters of a year. Finally, in treatment RandOne, there was random
matching and only a single course of manager interaction.6
For all treatments, we conducted three sessions with eight subjects participating in
each session. In treatments with random matching, all eight participants interacted;
with ¯xed matching, two groups of four subjects interacted but subjects could not tell
with whom they were matched. Table 4 summarizes our treatments and the treatment
variables.
Exchange rates were such that, in treatments FixFour and RandFour , owners
got one Deutsche mark for every 600 \points" and managers got one Deutsche mark
for every 80 \points." In treatment RandOne, this was changed to 300 and 40 points
for owners and managers, respectively. Average earnings in treatments FixFour and
RandFour (which lasted for about 90 minutes) were DM 37:67 and in treatment
RandOne (which lasted for about 50 minutes) DM 16:50.
The experiments were conducted in the computer lab of Humboldt University. In
6Originally, we expected theory to perform well in treatment RandFour. When it turned out that
this was not the case, we introduced the additional treatment RandOne, designed to give theory its
best shot. However, the RandOne treatment only con¯rmed the robustness of our earlier results.
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FixFour RandFour RandOne
Owner interaction over years ¯xed random random
Manager interaction over quarters ¯xed ¯xed |
Number of subjects participating 24 (= 6 £ 4) 24 (= 3 £ 8) 24 (= 3 £ 8)
Table 4: The treatments
total, 72 students, mainly of the department of business administration and economics,
participated. For the computerized experiment we used the software tool kit z-Tree,
developed by Fischbacher (1999). Translated instructions are provided in Appendix A.
3 Experimental Results
We will ¯rst present the contract choices of owners. Afterwards, we will analyze quan-
tity choices of managers. Together with an analysis of ex{post realized payo®s for ¯rm
owners, this will yield an overall interpretation of the results.
Choice of contracts (1st stage). Recall that theory predicts ¯rm owners to choose
the contract that induces managers to care not only for ¯rm pro¯ts but also for sales.
That is, theoretically we would expect owners to choose Contract B, or at least learn
to do so over time. Contrary to this prediction, we observe that in all three treatments
the equilibrium Contract B is only rarely chosen. Out of 180 cases each, the number of
Contract{B choices is 32 (17.8%), 29 (16.1%) and 48 (26.7%) in treatments FixFour,
RandFour and RandOne, respectively. The data clearly do not support the theory.
A binomial test even rejects the hypothesis that contracts are chosen equiprobably, that
is, the hypothesis that Contract B is chosen with a probability of p = 0:5 is rejected.7
7We conducted two tests. For the ¯rst, we counted each contract choice as one observation. This
test rejects the hypothesis at the 1% level. Since observations for individual owners might not be
independent, we conducted a second test, in which we counted each owner as one observation: A
dummy variable was 0 or 1 depending on whether the owner had a majority of A or B contracts. Using
these data we can reject the hypothesis at the 5% level.
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Figure 1: Number of contract choices in each third of the experiment (1st third: rounds
1-5; 2nd third: rounds 6-10; 3rd third: rounds 11-15)
Figure 1 shows for each treatment and for each third of the experiment the absolute
frequencies of Contract{A and Contract{B choices.8 A detailed analysis of the data
shows that the frequency of Contract B choices signi¯cantly decreases in treatments
FixFour andRandFourwhile the increase in treatmentRandOne is not signi¯cant.9
With regard to the absolute frequency of Contract{B choices across treatments,
we observe hardly any di®erence between treatments FixFour and RandFour (32
versus 29 out of 180 Contract{B choices). The di®erence between these two treatments
and treatment RandOne (48) is somewhat larger. However, a statistical test based on
the number of Contract{B choices as observed on the individual level over the whole
experiment indicates that this di®erence is also insigni¯cant.10
8See Table 7 in Appendix C for the corresponding values for each round separately.
9The correlation coe±cients between the number of contract{B choices and time are ¡:648 at
p = :009 for FixFour, ¡:821 at p = :000 for RandFour, and :430 at p = :109 for RandOne.
10For a test statistic, we determined the number of contract{B choices (a number between 0 and 15)
for each ¯rm owner separately. This generates 12 numbers for each treatment. Applying a two{tailed
Mann{Whitney U test we get the following p-levels: p = :887 (FixFour vs. RandFour); p = :266
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Subgame Theory FixFour RandFour RandOne
A/A 40 37:3
(3:6; N = 62)
37:0
(3:8; N = 67)
42:2
(6:2; N = 45)
A/B
A/B
(ind. quant.)
44
16 = 28
47:3
(4:1; N = 24)
23:0 = 24:3
(2:3 / 2:8)
45:5
(4:8; N = 17)
21:5 = 23:9
(2:4 / 3:0)
46:9
(4:4; N = 42)
20:6 = 26:3
(3:7 / 2:7)
B/B 48 49:2
(2:4; N = 4)
48:2
(6:2; N = 6)
50:7
(2:3; N = 3)
Table 5: Average observed industry output in subgames (standard deviation and num-
ber of observations in parentheses)
Choice of quantities (2nd stage). Since ¯rm owners could choose two di®erent
contracts, there are four di®erent subgames that managers can play. Recall that the
subgame{perfect equilibrium prescribes both managers to choose a quantity of 20 (24)
in case both ¯rm owners chose Contract A (B). If ¯rm owners choose di®erent contracts,
the manager who has Contract A (B) chooses a quantity of 16 (28). Table 5 shows
for each subgame both the theoretically predicted and the observed average industry
output for all treatments. For the asymmetric subgames with di®erent contracts, Table
5 also shows average individual quantities. Due to the behavior in the ¯rst stage, the
majority of observations is made after both owners choose Contract A.
Inspecting Table 5 we observe that theory predicts average industry output quite
well. Consider ¯rst symmetric subgames: In subgame A/A, FixFour and RandFour
are somewhat collusive, while RandOne is slightly more competitive than predicted.
In subgame B/B, average industry output is in all treatments larger than predicted,
(FixFour vs. RandOne), and p = :319 (RandFour vs. RandOne).
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but the predicted output is still within one standard deviation of the actual mean (note
that we only have a few observations here).
The di®erence between RandFour and RandOne is explained by cooperation of
the managers over the quarters: In treatment RandFour average industry output over
the ¯rst three quarters is 38:5 while it is signi¯cantly larger (42:0) in the last quarter
(across all subgames). In treatment FixFour there is no signi¯cant \end-quarter"
e®ect.11
Concerning individual quantities in asymmetric subgames (A/B), theory does not
predict well. In these cases, the manager with Contract B should choose a quantity
of 28 while the manager with Contract A should theoretically choose a quantity of
16. Inspecting Table 5, we notice that the observed average quantity chosen by the
manager with Contract B is lower than predicted, and the one chosen by the manager
with Contract A is much higher than predicted. Thus, the pseudo{Stackelberg leaders
with Contract B do not fully exploit their (theoretical) advantage while the pseudo{
Stackelberg followers with Contract A do not adapt to the theoretically anticipated
output of their competitors.
Overall interpretation. Of course, the behavior of managers in the subgames has a
strong impact on the owners' game. Assuming subgame-perfect behavior by managers,
the (truncated) owners' game is the 2£2 matrix game as shown in the upper-left corner
of Table 6. The other matrices shown in this Table are the (truncated) owners' games
given the empirical behavior of managers in the three di®erent treatments.12
Note that in theory the (truncated) owner game is a prisoners' dilemma with Con-
tract B being the dominant strategy. But, due to the observed behavior of managers
in the experiment, entirely di®erent payo® matrices emerge for owners: Given actual
quantity choices in the subgames, Contract A becomes the dominant strategy in all
treatments. The dilemma structure of the owner game disappears when managers'
11Signi¯cance levels of a two{tailed paired{sample T test were p = :000 for treatment RandFour
and p = :117 for treatment FixFour.
12To construct these matrices, we computed average earnings of owners resulting from play in the sub-
games. Consider, for example, treatment FixFour when one owner chooses Contract A and the other
Contract B. On average across all A/B outcomes, the owners received 272 and 293 points (rounded),
respectively.
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actual behavior is taken into account.13
As it is evident from Figure 1, owners start with a high proportion of contract
A choices. It turns out that deviating from A/A does not pay since managers with
Contract A punish managers with the \aggressive" Contract B.14 Such punishments
which violate the standard economic assumption of pure self{interest are frequently
observed in experiments. Recently, Fehr and Schmidt (1999) and Bolton and Ockenfels
(2000) have argued that such violations stem from an aversion against disadvantageous
inequality. If individual utility depends not only on own material well being but also
on the distribution of payo®s, the manager behavior can be rationalized.15
This, however, raises the question whether one would observe the same failure of
theory in asymmetric markets where inequality is unavoidable due to di®erent cost
conditions. Possibly, a design with asymmetric ¯rms could provide more favorable
conditions for the theory of strategic delegation to prove successful.16
4 Conclusion
In this paper, we have investigated strategic delegation in a homogenous{goods duopoly
experiment according to the models of Fershtman and Judd (1987), Sklivas (1987),
and Vickers (1985) (FJSV). While the theoretical literature has pointed out that the
FJSV prediction depends on intricate details of the model (the mode of competition,
the observability of contracts, uncertainty, risk aversion, etc.), our results show that
there is a weak point inherent even in the standard FJSV model. The prediction
depends on subgame{perfect behavior of managers. In our experiment, managers did
13Note that the non{equilibrium contract, A, is in all treatments chosen with a relative frequency
of more than 50% in almost all rounds. (The only exception is round 3 of treatment RandFour.
See Appendix C.) Compared to standard 2£ 2 prisoners' dilemma experiments (see e.g. Cooper et al.,
1996), we observe that owners in our experiment choose the cooperative strategy much more frequently.
14In Huck, MÄuller and Normann (1999) we analyze an experimental Stackelberg duopoly. There,
empirically observed reaction functions of the Stackelberg followers were sometimes upward sloping.
15Inequality aversion cannot explain why managers behave more competitively than the standard
theory predicts in the symmetric B/B subgames. However, note again that there are only very few
obervations in which both owners choose Contract B.
16This argument has been suggested by Chaim Fershtman and we believe that it merits a fully blown
follow-up study.
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Theory FixFour
A B A B
A 400; 400 260; 450 A 416; 416 272; 293
B 450; 260 290; 290 B 293; 272 253; 253
RandFour RandOne
A B A B
A 414; 414 295; 332 A 358; 358 259; 343
B 332; 295 265; 265 B 343; 259 238; 238
Table 6: The theoretical and the empirical reduced owner games
not play the subgame{perfect quantities in subgames with asymmetric contracts. As a
consequence, owners did not choose the equilibrium contract. Instead, they chose the
contract which gave managers pro¯t{maximizing incentives. In symmetric experimental
duopoly markets, the theory of strategic delegation fails.
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Appendix
A Translated Instructions
Welcome to our experiment!
Please read these instructions carefully. Do not talk to your neighbors, and stay
quiet during the course of the experiment. Raise your hand in case you have any
questions. We will come to your boot and answer the questions privately.
In this experiment you will have to make decisions repeatedly. Through these
decisions you can earn money. How much you earn depends on your decisions and on
the decisions of other participants. All participants receive the same instructions.
You will stay anonymous for us and for the other randomly chosen participants you
get in touch with during the experiment.
You are in a market with two ¯rms. Each ¯rm has an owner and a manager.
[In treatment FixFour and RandFour:] The experiment runs over 15 rounds
(\years"), each consisting of four periods (\quarters"). At the beginning of each year,
the owners of the two ¯rms decide on how to pay their managers. (The managers
cannot reject their contract.) For each owner, there are two variants for the contract,
contract A and contract B. These contracts are ¯xed for the entire year (4 quarters).
At the beginning of the ¯rst quarter of the year, every participant (i.e., both managers
and both owners) are informed about what contracts were chosen.
[In treatment RandOne:] The experiment runs over 15 rounds (\years"). At the
beginning of each year, the owners of the two ¯rms decide on how to pay their managers.
(The managers cannot reject their contract.) For each owner, there are two variants for
the contract, contract A and contract B. At the beginning of the year, every participant
(i.e., both managers and both owners) are informed about what contracts were chosen.
Knowing their contracts, the managers decide on the quantity of the good they
want to produce and sell. There are four possible quantities: 1, 2, 3 and 4. Dependent
on the chosen quantity, owners get their pro¯ts and managers their payments according
to their contracts.
All necessary information is included in 5 tables in the appendix.
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The four payment tables for the managers result from the chosen contract, i.e. there
is one table for the case that both owners choose contract A, one for the case that both
choose B, one for the case that one owner chooses A and the other B, and ¯nally one
for the reverse case.
The payment tables for a manager have the following form: The beginning of
each line shows his quantity decision (1, 2, 3, and 4), the head of each column shows
the decision of the other manager. There are four possible quantities, so there are 16
di®erent combinations, i.e. cells, in the table. Each of these cells contains two numbers.
In the upper left corner, you will ¯nd your own payment according to the market result,
the lower right corner gives the payment of the other manager.
The pro¯t table of the owners are built the same way: The gain of the owners
depends only on the decisions of the managers. The decision on the contract does not
directly in°uence the gains of the owners.
[In treatment FixFour and RandFour:] Your earnings at the end of the exper-
iment result from the cumulated payments/gains of the \15 years" or \60 quarters".
The managers' payments and the owners' gains are summed up. For the payment in
DM the exchange rate is for the managers 80 points = 1 DM, for the owners 600 points
= 1DM.
[In treatment RandOne.] Your earnings at the end of the experiment result from
the cumulated payments/gains of the \15 years". The managers' payments and the
owners' gains are summed up. For the payment in DM the exchange rate is for the
managers 40 points = 1DM, for the owners 300 points = 1 DM.
Consider once again the detailed course of the experiment. At the beginning of
the ¯rst round, both owners have to decide on the contract for their managers. After
that, all participants in the market are informed about the two decisions. [In treat-
ment FixFour and RandFour:] Now, both managers (knowing their contract and
the according payment table) have to decide upon their ¯rst quantity. [In treatment
RandOne:] Now, both managers (knowing their contract and the according payment
table) have to decide upon their quantity.
After that, again all participants are informed about the decisions, and everyone
is told his/her payment resulting from these decisions. In the following, the managers
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have to decide again on the next amounts, and only after the forth quarter the owners
can decide again about the contracts of their managers for the following \year". Now
the second round (\year") starts. The following rounds proceed accordingly. Each par-
ticipant keeps his/her role, and each manager stays with the same owner. [In treatment
FixFour:] Also, the composition of the market, consisting of two owners and two man-
agers, stays the same. [In treatment RandFour and RandOne:] The composition of
the market, consisting of two owners and two managers, changes randomly in each of
the 15 years [In treatment RandFour:] (but not in the quarters).
B How the payo® tables were derived
Deriving the payo® tables we had to face a number of conceptual problems. In the-
ory, only managers' relative incentives (gi) are important while absolute payments to
managers are ¯xed and, therefore, do not a®ect equilibrium outcomes. The reason for
this is that, assuming a competitive labor market for managers, managers will simply
receive their reservation wage. Given standard rationality assumptions, ¯rm owners
and managers can rely on the equilibrium prediction and contracts can be adjusted
accordingly|regardless of the relative incentives they provide. In an experiment this
does not work as the equilibrium prediction may be violated. Hence, ¯rm owners'
payments to managers would become variable. And this, in turn, would change the
equilibrium prediction. In order to reconcile the experiment with the FJSV theory,
we decided to let owners' pro¯ts to be independent of the payments to managers. In
other words, as in theory, owners' pro¯ts do not directly depend on the contracts they
give to their managers, but only on the (induced) quantities the managers choose. For
a particular combination of outputs, managers' salaries may di®er depending on their
contracts, while owners' pro¯ts are the same.17
The second problem is that Cournot games in matrix form exhibit multiple equilibria
(Holt, 1985). In order to get unique best replies and to make the numbers more easily
accessible for subjects, we slightly manipulated owners' payo®s which, in principle,
17In case a subject asked why owners get equal pro¯ts though managers' salaries di®er, we were
prepared to explain that managers' salaries were only a very small fraction of the ¯rms' pro¯t, not
a®ecting the pro¯ts written down in the payo® matrix. No subject ever asked such a question.
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were derived from ¦i = max f60 ¡ q1 ¡ q2; 0g qi; with q1; q2 2 f16; 20; 24; 28g. More
speci¯cally, we ¯rst rounded all entries to a multiple of 10, and then 2 £ 4 = 8 entries
of Table 1 were changed to lower or higher multiples of ten to get unique best replies.
Now turn to the managers' payo® tables. The matrix shown in Table 2 (left) is
simply derived by multiplying (non-rounded) owner pro¯ts with 0:13 and then rounding
the resulting values to integers.
If owners choose the contract with bonus, Contract B, another problem arises. If
managers simply got the above share of pro¯ts plus a payment for sales, payments under
the equilibrium contract would be always higher. Since owners' pro¯ts are independent
of managers' salaries, owners might simply choose an equilibrium contract because
their managers earn more. For this reason, we implicitly introduced a negative ¯xed
payment as part of Contract B. This negative ¯xed payment was such that average
payments with Contract B were just as high as with Contract A. Comparing the two
payo® matrices in Table 2, the reader will realize that, when quantities 16 and 20 are
chosen, payments are c.p. lower with Contract B, and, when quantities 24 and 28 are
chosen, payments are c.p. higher with Contract B. That is, when qi 2 f16; 20g there is
actually a malus for too few sales, and when qi 2 f24; 28g there is a bonus for larger
sales. The functional form for the bonus is (12qi ¡ 264) £ 0:13; qi 2 f16; 20; 24; 28g:
This explains how the matrices in Table 2 (right) and in Table 3 were derived.
C Further Data
Period 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
FixFour 8 9 9 10 8 10 11 11 9 10 11 11 10 10 11
RandFour 9 8 5 9 10 9 10 11 10 10 12 12 12 12 12
RandOne 11 9 9 7 10 11 9 7 10 9 9 7 7 9 8
Table 7: Number of contract{A choices across years (max.: 12)
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